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MINIMUM WAGES AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS 




This study explores the impact of minimum 
wages on the wages of construction workers in the 
informal sector. Using cross-sectional data 
consisting of 717 samples from 62 construction 
projects in 24 provinces in Indonesia, we uncover 
that the variation of construction worker wages 
across provinces follows the variation of minimum 
wages. On the demand variables, the magnitude of 
GDP and workers productivity in a province is not 
related to construction workers' earnings. While, 
on the supply side, the level of formality in a 
province shows a positive relation to construction 
workers' wages. In addition, the result also 
supports the previous literature that the nature of 
construction workers is moving from one project 
to another across cities as part-time workers. 
Lastly, another finding is that the base of 
estimation price in public procurement for the 
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1. Introduction 
The relation between legislated minimum wages and informal sectors sparks ongoing 
debates among economists. In the theoretical concept, there are two opposite views. On the one 
hand, scholars such as Welch (1974) and Mincer (1976) state that higher minimum wage 
legislation decreases informal wages in an elastic labor demand market due to the mobility of 
displaced labor from the formal into the informal sector. On the other hand, some experts such as 
Carruth & Oswald (1981), Leamer (1995), and Harrison & Leamer (1997) provide a general 
equilibrium model which shows that higher formal wages always increase informal sector wages. 
In Indonesia, a profession is always categorized as informal workers (BPS, 2020b); even the 
workers participate in a government project. The name of this profession is construction workers. 
Construction workers are the main job of more than 8 million Indonesian people; from that number, 
only less than 9% possess working-skill certificates (BPS, 2020b). The low level of formal 
certification resonates with the informality culture of the payment and employment of construction 
workers. On the employment side, a contractor never has a legal contract with workers (Rahardjo 
& Bermawi, 2014) and always put them as freelance workers (Stevia Lukmanasari & Soemardi, 
2016). On the payment side, a contractor delegates this matter to a mandor who functions as a 
labor provider dan a labor coordinator (Lukiyanto et al., 2015a). 
As informal workers, minimum wages legislation does not protect the wages of construction 
workers. In a construction project, the worker’s position determines the wages. The order of 
position from the lowest wages is helper, handyman, senior handyman, and mandor. If a minimum 
wages regulation protects construction workers, the base wages of a helper will be the same as the 
minimum wage. In the market, the wages of construction workers are determined by competitive 
market wages shaped by supply and demand. 
Based on the regulation of the Minister of Public Works and Housing number 14/2020, a 
bidder is subject to fair price evaluation only when offering a price less than 80% of the estimated 
price. Procurement committees must allow any labor wages despite lower than minimum wages 
when a bidder offers more than 80% of the estimated price. Suppose a bidder is subject to fair 
price evaluation. In that case, a committee will accept the bidder’s price as long as a bidder can 
prove that wages, material prices, and rental rates come from market prices, although the wages 
are lower than minimum wages. 
We have collected some data from the construction project procurement of the Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (MoF) year 2020. The data shows that the wages of 
construction workers are diverse across locations and contractors. In Indonesia, the minimum 
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wages are different at the provincial level. The diversity of construction worker wages may 
coincide with the minimum wages across provinces and provinces’ characteristics. 
From the prior paragraphs, we are bringing three primary pieces of information. First, there 
are two opposite views of economists in the relationship between minimum wages and informal 
wages. Second, a construction worker in Indonesia always becomes an informal and freelance 
worker, even in a government construction project. Third, the wages of construction workers are 
diverse across locations and contractors. From that facts, we want to test the relationship between 
project location characteristics and worker wages. To find out the relationship, we utilize Statistics 
Indonesia (BPS) dataset for location characteristics and the Ministry of Finance dataset for 
workers’ wages. 
The remainders of this article are structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
reviews of construction workers and the effect of minimum wages. Section 3 provides an overview 
of a construction project and its procurement in the Indonesian government. Section 4 explains the 
data and methodology used, and the final section offers results, analyses, and conclusions of this 
study. 
 
2. Literatur Review 
a. The dual labor market, partial equilibrium approach 
The condition of Indonesia's labour market that consists of the formal and informal sector 
is similar to the concept of a dual-sector economy from Welch (1974) and Mincer (1976). 
According to Welch (1974) model that is improved by Mincer (1976), the gap (ẇ) between wage 




having a complex relationship.  
Higher minimum wage legislation has opposite effects on the wage gap (ẇ) and the wage 
gap (ẇ) depends on some specific characteristics of the labor market. Mincer (1976) argues that 
if a formal labor market has a very elastic demand (η) and a low vacancy rate (δ), a higher 
minimum wage will lead to a lower wage in the informal sector and widening the gap (ẇ). Vice 
versa, in a location that its formal labor demand is very inelastic and has a high vacancy rate, a 
higher minimum wage will also benefit informal workers and narrowing the gap (ẇ). 
In a nutshell, the opposite effect of a higher minimum wage and the wage gap could be 
illustrated by the diagrams below: 
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Figure.1: A labour market condition where a higher minimum wage leads to a wider 
wage gap between formal and informal sectors. 
 
Figure.1 shows an effect of minimum wage legislation in the dual labor market with a high 
demand elasticity demand and a low vacancy rate (η > δ). In this type of labor market, legislation 
of minimum wage higher than the market wage (wm > w0) makes formal firms reduce labor from 
E0 to Lm. The number of vacancy rates that are less than jobs reduction causes the mobility of 
formal workers into the uncovered sector. The displaced workers from the formal sector, as many 
as OB, are looking for jobs in the informal sector. Thus, in the informal sector, the supply curve 
shifts from s to s’.  
The shift of the supply curve in the uncovered sector due to workers mobility from 
the covered sector creates a new equilibrium of wages and employment. On the wages side, 
more supply of workers decreases market wages from w0 to w1. On the employment side, 
the lower market wages w1 makes firms in the informal sector hire more labor from E′0 to 
E′1. The displaced workers that do not accept market wages in the uncovered sector will exit 
from the labor market. 
 
Figure.2: A labour market condition where a higher minimum wage leads to a smaller 
wage gap between formal and informal sectors. 
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Figure.2 shows an effect of minimum wage legislation in the dual labor market with a 
vacancy rate higher than demand elasticity (δ > η). Because vacancy rates exceed the elasticity 
of demand, introducing a minimum wage that is higher than the market wage (wm > w0) will not 
cause labor mobility from formal into informal sectors. The higher wage in the formal sector pulls 
laborers from the informal sector to find jobs in the covered sector. This condition reduces the 
supply of workers in the uncovered sector. The reduction of workers in the informal sector shifts 
the supply curve to the left and creates a higher wage market in the uncovered sector from w0 to 
w1. 
In the Figure.1 condition, the higher minimum wage worsens the market wage in the 
uncovered sector. When a minimum wage is getting higher, the gap of wages between the covered 
and the uncovered sector becomes wider. The higher minimum wage legislated in the Figure.1 
market will increase informal economic activities. While in the Figure.2 condition, workers in the 
uncovered sector are better off due to a higher minimum wage. Higher minimum wage legislation 
will reduce the wage gap between both sectors and increase formal economic activities. 
Aside from labor demand elasticities and the vacancy rate in the covered sector, Mincer 
(1976) explains that total labor elasticity and the minimum-wage coverage also contribute to the 
direction of wage and labor mobility. If η and e denote labor demand elasticities in the covered 
and uncovered sectors, δ is the vacancy rate in the covered sector, and k is the coverage of 
minimum wage; Mincer (1976) shows that the change of remuneration in the uncovered sector 
(ẇ1) is corresponding to the change of the minimum wage (ẇm) as follows: 
ẇ1 =
k(η − δ)
kδ + (1 − k)e
ẇm 
A new minimum wage regulation always keeps the sign of ẇm positive. Therefore, the wage 
in the uncovered sector is increasing (ẇ1 > 0) when δ > η, and the wage in the uncovered sector 
is decreasing (ẇ1 < 0) when δ < η. Simultaneously, Mincer (1976) also shows that the gap 
between market wage in the informal firm and the minimum wage (ẇ = ẇm + ẇ1) can be 
translated in an equation as follows: 
ẇ = ẇm + ẇ1 =
kη + (1 − k)e
kδ + (1 − k)e
ẇm 
In this equation, the gap between the minimum wage and the market wage of the uncovered 
sector (ẇ) is always positive even the informal wages (ẇ1) is increasing. This equation also shows 
that wages in the informal sector are unlikely to raise as much as wages in the formal sector. 
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b. The dual labor market, general equilibrium approach 
Using a general equilibrium approach, Carruth & Oswald (1981), Leamer (1995), and 
Harrison & Leamer (1997) present a concept of a dual labor market that is different from Welch 
(1974) and Mincer (1976). They argue that higher formal wages consistently correspond to higher 
informal sector wages. In this paper, we will mainly present Harrison & Leamer (1997) concept 
that is able to modify a traditional Lerner-Pearce diagram into a dual labor market condition. 
In the standard Lerner-Pearce diagram, any government regulation is assumed to be perfectly 
applied. Therefore, the standard Lerner-Pearce model only consists of a single labor market, and 
when a minimum wage is legislated, the coverage is 100%. In the standard model, the economy 
consists of tradable capital-intensive sectors (i.e., aerospace industries) and non-tradable labor-
intensive sectors (mason services). A capital-intensive firm uses relatively more capital than labor 
to produce an output compared to a labor-intensive service. The disparity of capital intensity 
between two sectors makes the input price ratio (
w
r




the mason services. The higher input price ratio (
w
r
) is also in line with the higher wage level. 
The labor market condition under the standard Lerner-Pearce diagram is depicted as follows: 
 
Figure.3: the effect of minimum wage with 100% coverage using standard Lerner-
Pearce diagram 
 
Prior to minimum wage legislation, the market wage rate is w, and the rent of capital rate is 
r. In the labor-intensive sector, the mason services sector, this sector employs labor as much as LM, 
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and uses capital as much as CM. While in the capital-intensive sector, aerospace industries sector, 
this sector employs labor as much as LA, and utilizes capital as much as CA. 
When the government legislated a minimum wage as much as wmin, the wages in the labor-
intensive and capital-intensive sectors are rising. Using the same constraint and the same level of 
technology, the two sectors' output will drop due to less labour and capital input. However, 
Harrison & Leamer (1997) explains that empirically, capital owners in the capital-intensive 
industries will maintain the output by discounting the capital rent rate from r into r’. The new rate 
of capital (r’) will keep three things in the capital-intensive industries: aerospace output, capital 
input, and labour input. The equilibrium in the aerospace industries post minimum wage legislation 
is yet at LA and CA. 
In the labor-intensive sector (mason services), the lower rate of capital (r’) is not enough to 
compensate for higher wages. Therefore, this labor-intensive sector is unable to maintain 
employment; then, the output must fall. In Figure.3, we can see that the minimum wage legislation 
makes mason services employ less labor from LM to L’M, and reduce output from M to M’. 
Harrison & Leamer (1997) explain that the enforcement of minimum wages is never 
perfectly implemented in all economies, especially in developing countries with a high level of 
informality. Therefore, the condition of Figure.3 is improbable to occur in the actual ground. 
Harrison & Leamer (1997) then modify the traditional Lerner-Pearce diagram to accommodate the 
dual-labor sector consists of covered and uncovered sectors as Figure.4 follows: 
 
Figure.4: the effect of minimum wage in the dual-labor sector in a general equilibrium 
model 
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In an economy that consists of formal and informal sectors, minimum wage legislation does 
not cover the informal sectors. In this case, we put aerospace industries (capital-intensive) as the 
covered sector and mason services as the informal sector. When the government legislated a 
minimum wage, capital owners in the capital-intensive industries will maintain the output by 
discounting the capital rent rate from r into r’. The new rate of capital (r’) will maintain three things 
in the capital-intensive industries: aerospace output, capital input, and labour input. 
As an uncovered sector, Mason services do not apply minimum wages in their payment but 
get an advantage from a lower rate of capital (r’). The lower price of capital and the absence of 
minimum wages in mason services make this sector able to increase the output from M to M’. To 
increase the output, mason services use more capital and labor inputs. Due to the limited number 
of laborers, the output expansion of mason services will increase the wage market of informal 
economies. 
 
c. Empirical findings 
From the theoretical concepts above, there are similarities and differences. Welch (1974), 
Mincer (1976), Leamer (1995), Carruth & Oswald (1981) and Harrison & Leamer (1997) agree 
that minimum wages increase wages in the formal sector. The debate occurs in whether minimum 
wages harm or benefit the informal sector. Based on that theoretical concept, several empirical 
studies show similar results on minimum wage effect on formal sector wages. The mixed findings 
occur in the impact of minimum wages on employment in both sectors and wages in the informal 
sector. 
Maloney & Mendez (2003) empirical study found that a higher minimum wage contributes 
to the wages hike in formal and informal sectors in Columbia. Maloney & Mendez (2003) also 
find that the higher minimum wages harm employment in both sectors. In the paper, Maloney & 
Mendez (2003) explains that Columbia is a country that has high and binding minimum wages. 
The high degree of minimum wage and enforcement in the Columbian economy is similar to the 
condition of the traditional Lerner-Pearce diagram. However, in Columbia, the new and lower rate 
of capital cannot compensate for the new minimum wage. Therefore, a minimum wage makes the 
level of employment in capital-intensive and labor-intensive sectors shrinking. 
Other studies in Latin America by Gindling & Terrell (2007) and Alaniz et al. (2011) find 
that higher minimum wages decrease formal employment. Although they do not see a significant 
effect of minimum wages on the informal sector of Latin America, Mincer (1976) theoretical 
concept seems more suitable to explain the phenomenon. The negative impact on formal 
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employment after minimum wage legislation in a high informality and low enforcement rate in 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua aligns with Mincer (1976) theoretical concept. 
A study in South Africa by Dinkelman & Ranchhod (2012) find that higher minimum wages 
increase wages of formal and informal sectors without harming the employment level. According 
to Dinkelman & Ranchhod (2012), South Africa has a low coverage of minimum wages and a high 
level of informality. The neutral effect on employment level and positive impact on wages 
correspond with Harrison & Leamer (1997) concept of the dual sector using the general 
equilibrium approach. 
Delving the effect of minimum wages on the informal sectors, many researchers give 
attention to Indonesia. This country has a high level of informality and a low level of enforcement. 
In 2012, Based on 1990 – 2006 Indonesia manufacturing survey data, Del Carpio et al. (2012) find 
that new minimum wages create labor mobility from formal into the informal sector due to fewer 
jobs in the formal sector. The evidence of labor mobility from formal into informal sector 
represents the positive employment effect in the provincial level and negative employment effect 
in the manufacturing sector level subsequent to a higher minimum wage. Like Del Carpio et al. 
(2012), Siregar (2019) also finds that higher minimum wages create worker mobility from formal 
to informal. According to Mincer (1976) theoretical framework, labor mobility will harm informal 
sector wages. However, Del Carpio et al. (2012) and Siregar (2019) cannot conclude whether 
worker mobility increases or decreases wages in the informal sector. 
Using panel data of Indonesian households’ waves 1993, 1997, and 2000 from IFLS, 
Magruder (2013) finds that a higher minimum wage creates a big push in the decade of Indonesia’s 
economic boom. The higher minimum wages, which coincide with the economic boom between 
1990 – 2000, increased wages and employment in the formal sector. The increased demand and 
vacancy rates in the formal sector pull the workers from the informal sector. Therefore, the 
workers' mobility from the informal into the formal sector elevates wages in the uncovered sector. 
Using different waves of IFLS, Hohberg & Lay (2015) finds similarities and differences with 
Magruder (2013). Based on IFLS waves 1997, 2000, and 2007, Hohberg & Lay (2015) shows that 
the higher minimum wages from 1997 – 2007 do not reduce formal employment. In the study, 
Hohberg & Lay (2015) does not find any significant effect of minimum wages on employment and 
wages in the informal sector. 
The studies of the effect of minimum wages on the informal sector in Indonesia use almost 
the same period. The period of study from Del Carpio et al. (2012), Siregar (2019), Magruder 
(2013), and Hohberg & Lay (2015) are around the 1990s to 2000s. Although using a similar period, 
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their result on the effect of minimum wages on informal wages is unclear. Del Carpio et al. (2012), 
Siregar (2019), Magruder (2013), and Hohberg & Lay (2015) are unable to conclude whether a 
new minimum wage harms or benefits informal wages. Only Magruder (2013) concludes that 
minimum wages during Indonesia economic boom benefits informal earnings. 
To get a clearer picture of the effect of minimum wages on the informal sector, we should 
pick a particular profession that is always categorized as informal. In Indonesia, a profession is 
always classified as informal workers (BPS, 2020); even the workers participate in a government 
project. The name of this profession is construction workers. As informal labor, their wages are 
always determined by market wages. According to our theoretical framework, the wages of 
construction workers are influenced by the magnitude of minimum wages. To be precise, we 
should conduct research to quantify the direction and the magnitude of construction worker wages 
relative to minimum wages. 
This paper wants to add to the empirical findings by studying the relationship between 
minimum wages and construction workers earnings. Usually, studies on the relationship between 
minimum wages and the informal sector in Indonesia use IFLS and Statistic Indonesia dataset. 
Both datasets do not provide information on wages in a particular informal profession such as 
construction workers. In this paper, we use a dataset from Statistic Indonesia and a dataset from 
construction project procurement of the MoF. Combining the dataset, we can analyze the 
relationship between minimum wages and Indonesian construction workers earnings. 
 
3. Construction Workers and The Procurement 
a. Construction Workers in Indonesia 
One of the main tools of the Government of Indonesia to increase the nation's economic 
growth is through infrastructure development, in this case, the construction sector. The 
construction sector's role is associated closely with the absorption of labor, the number of 
infrastructure projects, the investment of capital, the related supporting sectors, and even become 
facilitators in the movement and growth of goods and services.  
Construction is a labor-intensive industry in developing countries, with no exception in 
Indonesia. The utilization of the large labor force in Indonesia causes the growth of the 
construction industry to increase from year to year. There is a growing number of workers from 
2018 to 2019, from 1,287,225 to 1,344,571 (BPS, 2020a). Growth in the number of construction 
workers has been accompanied by the growth of the value of completed construction, which is 
very significant, especially the construction of civil (rise 206.97 percentage). This indicates that 
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labor in the construction sector has a dominant role in determining the industry's success (Soemardi 
& Pribadi, 2018). 
There are three factors related to construction project management, namely resource 
management, equipment management, and management system (Lukiyanto et.al, 2015a). In 
developed countries, project management uses modern management techniques to coordinate 
human and material resources. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, even for large projects, the contractors 
combine modern and traditional management techniques. The utilization of workers with low 
experience and competence is still used in traditional management. In developing countries such 
as Indonesia, the number of unskilled labor is vast in the construction sector (Lukiyanto et.al, 
2015a). 
Management and utilization of human resources are the primary focus in industrial 
construction (Soemardi & Pribadi, 2018). According to Khoramshasi in Soemardi & Pribadi 
(2018), the management of the construction worker is more challenging than the management of 
material and other aspects. BPS (2020a) shows that 44.13% of construction workers are just 
elementary school graduates. This condition potentially affects knowledge transfer, which requires 
more effort and time from senior employees to junior workers. The low level of education also 
becomes a challenge in the use of technology in the construction project.  
Furthermore, there is a cultural shift in the recent decade where workers do not just follow 
one foreman or mandor (Lukiyanto et.al, 2015b). Rahardjo & Bermawi (2014) define that “The 
mandor is a person who has the capability to hire people to work together for a certain time, certain 
location and for a certain purpose at a construction project.” This is due to the fact that first, 
construction employees working as regular jobs cannot rely on just one foreman/mandor to get a 
job and fulfil their daily needs. Second, the growing influence of information and 
telecommunications media allows workers to change their mindset to become a capitalist mindset. 
According to Olken in Lukiyanto, et al. (2015b), this condition reflects that human resources 
management becomes more vulnerable because informal workers can move from one project to 
another easily and freely. In addition, employee loyalty will fade. 
From the side of competency, the number of permanent construction employees is less than 
the number of casual workers or informal workers (BPS, 2020a). Statistics also show that 
Indonesia's number of skilled workers is still minimal compared to all workers in the construction 
sector, around 700 thousand compared to 8 million. Skilled workers are workers who have 
certificates in accordance with the competencies issued by the applicable organization. These 
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records mean that only around 8.75 percent of workers are registered and are referred to as formal 
sector workers. At the same time, the rest are considered informal sector workers. 
Generally, workers in the construction sector in Indonesia are seasonal workers who work 
in the agricultural industry. They work on the construction projects after the harvest in their village 
ends. When the construction project is finished, they will return to their town to continue working 
as farmers. However, when the agricultural land is getting narrower due to land conversion for 
other land usages, these workers are working in construction projects as a permanent job, no longer 
seasonal (Lukiyanto et.al, 2015b). Thus, Soemardi (2011) finds that they work from one project to 
another or as part-time workers due to limited education and competence. 
 
b. Workers Wage in the Public Construction Project 
Based on BPS (2020a), the construction company in Indonesia amounted to around 159 
thousand companies and spread throughout the entire territory of Indonesia. The Majority of 
construction companies are coming from the province on the island of Java (East Java, Middle 
Java, Yogyakarta, Jakarta and West Java), the province of Riau, and South Sulawesi. This 
phenomenon is in line with the construction value data completed by the province throughout 2019 
(BPS, 2020a). The big three provinces with the highest construction project values are DKI Jakarta, 
East Java and West Java (BPS, 2020a). 
Construction Companies generally use two types of workers, namely formal workers and 
informal workers. Formal workers are workers who come from within the company, and their 
working hours are full time. These workers have a career path within the company structure, and 
they are generally paid monthly. In comparison, informal workers are contracted labor or from 
outside the company. Casual workers make deals with the company to carry out the particular 
work during the specific time. Their wages are usually paid on a daily basis. 
Not to be denied that workers' wages have a significant portion in the construction budget, 
approximately around 30% (Stevia Lukmanasari & Soemardi 2016). The wages of construction 
workers in Indonesia are divided on a daily and monthly basis. The characteristic of the wage for 
construction workers in developing countries such as Indonesia is that the components of the 
wages are not arranged in detail. Thus, the contractor is difficult to accurately estimate the burden 
of the cost of labor for a project (Stevia Lukmanasari & Soemardi, 2016). 
In the public procurement of construction projects, the commitment officer (PPK) assigns 
the components of worker wages in the Bill of Quantity based on minimum wages. Minimum 
wages in each province in Indonesia are different. Meanwhile, a construction company generally 
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proposes workers' wages according to the market price when participating in a tender. There is a 
difference between workers' wages based on minimum wages and wages based on market prices. 
Usually, wages at market prices are lower than minimum wages. In the first conditions, the 
company's offer price was lower than the price prepared by the PPK (less than 80%). Another 
condition is that the company's offer price remains above 80% of the estimated price, but the wage 
component of workers remains below the minimum wage.  
The procurement committee provides different treatments for the two conditions above. 
For the first condition, the procurement committee must evaluate the fairness of the price. If the 
company can prove that the wage of construction workers is based on market prices, the committee 
will accept the proof. Even though the salary is below the market price, for the second condition, 
the committee will not check the wage as long as the company submits a bid price above 80% of 
the estimated cost. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
a. Data 
The data used in this research is secondary data. Specifically, this study employs data from 
the Statistics Indonesia (BPS) dataset for 2020 to represent the minimum wages and characteristics 
of construction project locations. Another data source comes from the Ministry of Finance dataset, 
which is workers' wages from the construction project procurement year 2020. Accordingly, the 
sample of this research consists of 717 worker wages from 62 construction projects in 24 provinces 
in Indonesia. Although the construction projects do not cover all provinces in Indonesia, the 
sample is considered to have represented all provinces in Indonesia (24 out of 34 provinces). 
Minimum wages in Indonesia are different at the provincial level. In 2020, the average 
minimum wage from 34 provinces is Rp2,664,186.56 per month. DKI Jakarta has the highest 
minimum wage that is Rp4,276,349.00, while the lowest is Yogyakarta which is Rp1.704.607.00 
per month. From 34 provinces, 5 have monthly minimum wages less than Rp2,000,000.00, 19 
have monthly minimum wages Rp2,000,000.00 to Rp3,000,000.00, and 10 of them more than 
Rp3,000,000.00. 
Construction wages are also different across contractors and provinces. From 717 samples 
in 24 provinces, the average helper wage is Rp2,384,799.65 monthly (25 working days). On 
average, the helper wage in Jakarta is the highest among other provinces at Rp2,790,577.37 
monthly. The lowest helper wage occurred in Jawa Tengah that is Rp1,719,833.33 monthly. From 
our sample, the average helper wages in the four provinces are still less than Rp2,000,000.00 
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monthly. Those provinces are Jawa Tengah, NTT, Yogyakarta, and Aceh. In the other 20 
provinces, on average, the helpers get more than Rp2,000,000.00 monthly. 
More detailed information about minimum wages and helper wages are presented in 
Table1. and Table2. below. 
Table1. Indonesia Monthly Minimum Wages 2020 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Rp2,664,186.56 Rp2,595,930.00 Rp552,412.42 
  Province 
Minimum Rp1.704.607.00 Yogyakarta 
Maximum Rp4,276,349.00 DKI Jakarta 




19 Provinces (55.88%) NTB, Bengkulu, Sulawesi Tengah, Kalimantan 
Barat, Lampung, Banten, Sumatera Barat, Bali, 
Sumatera Utara, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi 
Barat, Gorontalo, Maluku, Jambi, Maluku 
Utara, Kalimantan Selatan, Riau, Kalimantan 
Tengah, Kalimantan Timur 
> Rp3,000,000.00 10 Provinces (29.41%) Kalimantan Utara, Kepulauan Riau, Sumatera 
Selatan, Sulawesi Selatan, Aceh, Papua Barat, 
Bangka Belitung, Sulawesi Utara, Papua, DKI 
Jakarta 
 
Table2. Indonesia Helper Wages in A Construction Project 2020 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Rp2,384,799.65 Rp2,250,799.65 Rp580,799.34 
  Province 
Minimum Rp1.719,833.33 Jawa Tengah (average) 
Maximum Rp2,790,577.37 DKI Jakarta (average) 
< Rp2,000,000.00 4 Provinces (16.67%) Jawa Tengah, NTT, Yogyakarta, Aceh 
Rp2,000,000.00 – 
Rp2,500,000.00 
14 Provinces (58.33%) Bengkulu, Gorontalo, Sulawesi Tengah, NTB, 
Sulawesi Selatan, Sumatera Selatan, Sumatera 
Barat, Bali, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sumatera 
Utara, Riau, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan 
Utara, Kalimantan Barat 
> Rp2,500,000.00 6 Provinces (25.00%) Jawa Barat, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan 
Timur, Sulawesi Utara, Banten, DKI Jakarta 
 
To understand the relationship between wages and minimum wage per province, this 
journal implements two dependent variables: the gap of wages and helper wages. The definition 
of the gap of wages is the gap between a helper wage paid by an informal firm in a construction 
project and the regional minimum wage in each province in Indonesia. Meanwhile, helper wages 
are the wage of a helper paid by a contractor in a construction project. We use helper wages in this 
study because helper wages are considered the lowest of all worker wages on a construction 
project. On the other hand, this study takes the minimum wages in each province in Indonesia as 
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the independent variable. As previously explained, the minimum wages in each province in 
Indonesia are different. Minimum wages data comes from BPS in 2020. 
Helper wages vary across contractors and provinces. From 717 samples of helper wages 
from 24 provinces, the average is Rp2,384,799.65 monthly (25 working days). The variation in 
wages between contractors in a province is lower than the variation across provinces. Across 24 
provinces, the average standard deviation is Rp580,799.34. While within a provincial level, the 
average standard deviation is Rp342,457.35. From 24 provinces, helper wages in 4 provinces are 
higher than regional minimum wages; those provinces are Jawa Barat, Banten, Yogyakarta, and 
Kalimantan Barat. Helper wages in 20 other provinces are lower than minimum wages, the highest 
gap occurring in DKI Jakarta, followed by Aceh and Sulawesi Selatan. 
 
Figure5. The standard deviation of helper wages at the provincial level from 717 samples 
in 24 provinces 
 
                                




Avg. helper wages 
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In addition, to control for the socioeconomic background of the wages, this study utilizes 
variables that describe the characteristics of construction work project locations. This study uses 
data on the Gross Domestic Product of a province, the proportion of formal workers, the number 
of residents in the working-age and the number of freelance and informal workers in the non-
agriculture sector. This study also adds productivity per province by linking the GDP of the 
province with the number of active workers in the province concerned. 
GDP of a province and workers productivity represent labor demand in a particular location 
(Siregar, 2019). Greater demand may relate to higher market wages for construction workers. 
However, our data suggest that the variation of helper wages across provinces does not align with 
workers productivity. The standard deviation of average annual helper wages in 24 provinces is 
Rp3,330,858.17, while the standard deviation of workers productivity is Rp123,472,928.25. The 
big gap between helper wages and worker productivity in more affluent provinces may relate to 
income inequality. 
                       
Figure7. Helper wages and workers productivity (a yearly basis) 
 
The proportion of formal workers in a province represents the level of coverage of 
minimum wage regulation. From partial and general equilibrium approaches, the more coverage 
and more binding wage enforcement, a minimum wage will give more effect to informal earnings. 
Our data from 717 samples in 24 provinces indicate a positive relationship between the proportion 
of formal workers and construction worker wages. 
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Figure 8. Helper Wages and The Proportion of Formal Workers 
 
The supply of workers is closely related to the number of working-age and non-farming 
freelance workers. The more supply, the market wage of labor should be lower. However, the 
higher number of workers in a province may also correlate with higher demand for buildings and 
more construction projects. We present more complete information about wages, labor supply and 
labor demand variables of 24 provinces in the table below. 
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Table3. Helper Wages and The Proportion of Formal Workers 















The number of 
working-age 
 
The number of 
non-farming 
freelance workers 
1 Jawa Tengah 1,719,833.33 1,742,015 1,348,600.40 76,900,576 37.25 27,009,296 1,444,000 
2 NTT 1,875,000.00 1,945,902 106,506.13 39,071,126 23.9 3,895,453 71,000 
3 Yogyakarta 1,909,223.11 1,704,607 138,388.75 65,083,812 42.59 3,132,754 117,000 
4 Aceh 1,983,333.33 3,165,030 166,377.30 70,501,694 38.12 3,881,102 138,000 
5 Bengkulu 2,018,750.00 2,213,604 73,336.58 71,070,773 30.77 1,499,572 48,000 
6 Gorontalo 2,041,071.43 2,586,900 41,725.90 73,388,349 37.88 893,745 25,000 
7 Sulawesi Tengah 2,080,969.58 2,303,710 197,440.78 130,208,178 32.63 2,269,144 61,000 
8 NTB 2,125,000.00 2,183,883 133,521.76 51,833,867 26.53 3,817,696 180,000 
9 Sulawesi Selatan 2,234,090.67 3,103,800 504,478.54 125,911,252 35.78 6,744,921 118,000 
10 Sumatera Selatan 2,250,000.00 3,043,111 458,430.30 112,047,760 34.74 6,307,012 142,000 
11 Sumatera Barat 2,277,750.00 2,484,041 242,118.76 93,789,080 33.72 4,016,776 124,000 
12 Bali 2,287,343.75 2,493,523 224,214.11 92,519,746 43.31 3,455,127 107,000 
13 Sulawesi 
Tenggara 
2,312,500.00 2,552,014 130,184.07 100,978,001 35.41 1,934,802 46,000 
14 Sumatera Utara 2,317,576.09 2,499,422 811,282.84 118,569,565 40.38 10,703,311 323,000 
15 Riau 2,333,333.33 2,888,563 729,166.64 241,207,256 44.03 4,946,105 112,000 
16 Kalimantan 
Tengah 
2,336,458.33 2,890,093 152,190.91 115,459,449 44.2 2,019,517 47,000 
17 Kalimantan Utara 2,445,817.31 3,000,803 100,544.34 304,273,199 49.07 522,832 14,000 
18 Kalimantan Barat 2,477,375.00 2,399,698 214,001.75 87,052,881 36.99 3,791,656 85,000 
19 Jawa Barat 2,514,672.73 1,810,350 2,088,038.74 96,334,616 44.41 37,512,832 1,551,000 
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2,539,562.50 2,877,447 179,151.11 85,993,124 39.18 3,154,399 87,000 
21 Kalimantan Timur 2,581,428.03 2,981,378 607,320.78 358,767,849 52.86 2,775,171 52,000 
22 Sulawesi Utara 2,593,750.00 3,310,722 132,299.41 116,583,695 39.54 1,931,636 73,000 
23 Banten 2,759,197.17 2,460,968 626,437.44 112,827,456 50.83 9,636,060 340,000 
24 DKI Jakarta 2,790,577.37 4,276,349 2,772,381.12 595,027,209 61.78 8,199,694 150,000 
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b. Methodology 
Answering research questions, this study will employ statistical methods, Ordinary Least 
Squares in the context of multiple regression models by using cross-section data. Multiple 
regression analysis helps to observe many variables that affect the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2016 p.63). In addition, the data that we will use are taken at a specific time, which 
is 2020. In order to obtain unbiased results, this research needs to fulfil several assumptions, 
namely, linear in parameters, random sampling, no perfect collinearity, zero conditional mean, 
homoscedasticity and normality (Woldridge, 2016). This study obtained a random sampling of 
wage data for workers in the Ministry of Finance procurement with a reasonably vast sampling 
number. Analysis of cross-sectional data is also commonly used for applied microeconomics such 
as labor economics. 
A structured model is proposed to examine the relationship between minimum wages, the 
gap of the wages, and wages that a contractor pays in a construction project based on a conceptual 
framework. The model consists of 8 variables with a total of 717 samples. In order to obtain 
unbiased results, we should detect violations of classical assumptions, namely multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, using the STATA program. 
Multicollinearity is a linear relationship between independent variables (Nachrowi and 
Usman, 2002). We need to do a Multicollinearity test to check whether a model has a "perfect" or 
"almost perfect" linear relationship between several independent variables. Although in practice, 
generally multicollinearity cannot be avoided (Nachrowi and Usman, 2002. This is because it is 
difficult to find two independent variables that are mathematically uncorrelated (correlation = 0). 
However, we need to pay attention if there is significant multicollinearity. 
In econometrics, a situation where the variance (σ2) of the confounding factor it or error 
terms, or disturbance error is arbitrary for all observations or observations on the independent 
variable is called homoscedasticity (homoscedasticity) or the same variance. If the value of the 
variance of the dependent variable increases as a result of increasing the variance of the 
independent variable, the variance of the dependent variable is not the same. In econometrics, this 
is called the heteroscedasticity condition. The essence of heteroscedasticity is the variance of the 
error term not constant, or there is an error term correlation with the independent variable. 
Nachrowi & Usman (2002) explain why we should pay attention to heteroscedasticity because if 
the variance of the regression coefficient is wider, it will impact the inaccuracy of the hypothesis 
and will subsequently impact the inaccuracy of the hypothesis affect the accuracy of the 
conclusion. 
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For autocorrelation assumptions, violations of these assumptions are more often found in 
time series data (Nachrowi & Usman, 2002). This is because time series data is the history of 
certain characteristics of an individual. In comparison, this study will only use a particular time, 
namely 2020, for various individuals. 
 
5. Results, Analyses, and Conclusion 
a. Empirical Model 
Based on theoretical frameworks, data, and methodology above, we use this econometric 
model: 
y = β0 + β1wmj + β2GDPj + β3Prodj + β4Formalj + β5Waj + β6Fwj + ε 
Where: 
Table4. Variables in the empirical model 
Variables Definition Notation 
Dependent variables 
Gap of wages The gap (ẇ) between a helper wage paid by an informal 
firm (w1) in a construction project and the regional 




We add 100 to avoid negative results when a helper wage is 
higher than the regional minimum wage. The lower the 
helper wage, the higher the gap (ẇ). 
When  ẇ = 100, a helper wage is equal to the regional 
minimum wage. 
When ẇ > 100, a helper wage is less than the regional 
minimum wage. 
When ẇ < 100, a helper wage is more than the regional 
minimum wage. 
ẇ 
Helper wages The monthly wage of a helper paid by a contractor in a 













GDP of province j divided by the number of workers in 
province j, in a million Rupiah (Rp1,000,000) 
Prodj 
The proportion of 
formal workers 
Share of formal workers in a province j, in 1-100 scale Formalj 
Number of 
working age 
Number of the population more than 15 years old in a 





Number of freelance and informal workers in the non-
agriculture sector in a province j, in a hundred thousand 
(100,000) 
Fwj 
Error term - Ε 
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b. Results 
The author needs to tackle issues related to the violation of classical assumptions, namely 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. First, for the issue of multicollinearity, we have tested the 
correlation of the independent variables and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. We found 
that there was a reasonably high correlation between the GDP and worker productivity variables. 
However, we estimate that these two variables are essential to remaining in the model. In addition, 
the model in this study is also in line with Siregar's research (2019), where the researcher places 
GDP and Productivity of workers as independent variables in one model. This is done to avoid 
"specification bias", which is a condition where the author excludes the independent variable, 
which is very important in a model (Nachrowi & Usman, 2002). In addition, multicollinearity also 
does not violate the Gauss Markov assumption. It does not violate the OLS assumption, so the 
study can still obtain the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) results. 
Second, we have done some work to overcome the assumption of heteroscedasticity. We 
used the graph method, White Test, Breusch-Pagan Test and Glejser Test to detect 
heteroscedasticity in the model. The author needs to try several alternative solutions to handle the 
issue: the natural logarithm transformation (Ln) or the weighted least squares method. We apply 
the second option using the STATA program. Finally, the model has been consistent 
The regression outcomes of the relation between construction worker wages and minimum 
wages are presented in the table below: 
Table5. Regression results 
 Gap of wages  Helper wages (100.000) 
Variables Coefficients Robust SE Coefficients Robust SE 
Intercept 58.2492** 8.4675 7.3609** 1.6188 
wmj 4.1426** 0.3331 0.1570** 0.0496 
GDPj 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
Prodj -0.0364 0.0218 0.0038 0.0043 
Formalj -0.9774** 0.1438 0.2423** 0.0363 
Waj -0.2739** 0.0767 0.0772** 0.0133 
Fwj 4.9117** 1.5318 -1.2477** 0.2438 
















p-value < 0.01 = **, p-value < 0.05 = * 
 
The outcome shows a significant relation between minimum wages (wmj), gap of wages, 
and helper wages. From that result, we can say that the higher minimum wage in a province 
increases the gap of wages. However, the higher wage gap does not harm the construction worker 
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wages. In the regions that have relatively higher minimum wages, the construction worker wages 
are also higher. 
From the coefficients’ magnitude, the regression shows two main pieces of information 
related to minimum wages. First, a hundred thousand higher minimum wages correlate to 4.14 
points of a higher wage gap. Second, a hundred thousand higher minimum wages relate to 
Rp15,700 higher helper wages. 
The direction of the relationship between control and dependent variables is parallel to the 
law of supply and demand. Provinces’ GDP (GDPj) and workers productivity (Prodj) are among 
labor demand factors. Whereas the number of working-age (Waj) and the number of non-farming 
freelance workers (Fwj) affect the labor supply. 
The proportion of formal workers (Formalj) in the regression model represents the 
coverage of minimum wages regulation. The regression outcome shows that the higher formality 
is associated with the lower wage gap and the higher construction worker wages. 
 
c. Analyses 
Minimum wages and construction worker wages 
Using 717 observations from the real ground and competitive procurement processes, we 
manage to extrapolate the relationship between minimum wages and informal wages. In the 
empirical model, we include location characteristics at the provincial level as control variables. 
The control variables may bring the relationship between minimum wages and informal wages 
becomes statistically significant. Moreover, location characteristics also manage to interpret the 
variation of construction worker wages across regions with similar minimum wages levels. 
A helper in a construction project has the lowest position and the lowest-earning compared 
to other workers. Therefore, a helper wage is a suitable parameter for comparing construction 
workers' market wages and minimum wages. The regression result shows that the magnitude of 
minimum wages is in line with the market wages of construction workers and the gap of wages. 
In the dual sector labor market theorem with a partial equilibrium approach, workers 
mobility is the leading cause of a hike or fall of informal wages. When a new minimum wage is 
followed by workers' mobility from a formal into an informal sector, the wages of the informal 
sector fall and its output expands. Vice versa, the wages of the informal sector hike, and the output 
is shrinking. While in the general equilibrium approach, the change of informal wages is due to 
the growth or the contraction of output. If a new minimum wage is followed by the growth of 
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informality, the wages in the uncovered sector will increase. Vice versa, if a new wage regulation 
is followed by a reduction of informal activities, the informal wage falls. 
Our regression result shows positive and significant relation between minimum wages 
(wmj), the gap of wages, and helper wages. This finding portrays some critical points concerning 
formal and informal wages subsequent to a higher minimum wage. First, a higher minimum wage 
benefits both formal and informal earnings. Second, the formal sector gets more benefit from 
higher minimum wages as a higher gap of wages happens in the provinces with higher minimum 
wages. Third, the higher minimum wages correlate to the busier construction activities. According 
to the general equilibrium approach, an output expansion is the main cause of higher wages in the 
informal sector. A positive and significant relation between minimum wages (wmj), the gap of 
wages, and helper wages indicate busier construction activities in the provinces with higher 
minimum wages. 
Our empirical finding also shows that a general equilibrium approach is more suitable to 
explain Indonesia dual labor market. The relation between formal and informal wages is easily 
understood using Harrison & Leamer (1997) diagram that shows a similar direction between 
formal and informal wages. As a developing country with a low enforcement level on labor 
regulation, a lower rate of capital that follows higher minimum wages will prosper Indonesia's 
informal economy and informal workers. 
In the partial equilibrium approach theorem, Welch (1974) and Mincer (1976) argue that 
formal and informal wages walk in the opposite direction, except there are conditions causing 
workers mobility into the formal sector. Those conditions are a high vacancy rate and an inelastic 
demand in the formal sector. Workers' mobility into the formal sector makes labor scarcity in the 
informal sector. This scarcity then moves informal wages to a higher level. However, this concept 
is not suitable to explain our findings because it is hard to compute vacancy rate and demand 
elasticity from annual economic surveys and there is no indication of labor mobility into the formal 
sector. 
 
Location characteristics and construction worker wages 
The variables of location characteristics represent labor supply and demand factors. We put 
the GDP of a province (GDPj) and workers productivity in a province (Prodj) as variables that 
affect labor demand. In the labor supply, we put the number of working-age in a province (Waj) 
and the number of non-farming freelance workers in a province (Fwj). We also put the proportion 
Muhammad Iqbal Mutaqin, Choirul En Huda / Jurnal Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Publik Indonesia 8 (2) 2021 19-45 
 
 
                             Jurnal Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Publik Indonesia: Volume 8, No. 2, November 2021 ISSN: 2442-7411 
   135 
 
of formal workers in a province (Formalj) to monitor the coverage of minimum wages regulation 
in each province. 
Relating to the theoretical frameworks, the magnitude of labor supply and demand can shift 
the equilibrium of wages in the formal and informal sectors. For informal workers, greater wages 
should occur in the regions that have greater labor demand. However, regression results show 
insignificant relation between workers productivity in a province (Prodj) to the gap of wages and 
helper wages. GDP of a province (GDPj) also shows zero effect on wages and helper wages. 
The insignificant relation between workers productivity in a province and helper wages 
may occur because of unequal magnitude patterns. The mean and median of helper wages are just 
around 2 million Rupiahs. On the other hand, the mean and median of workers productivity show 
a high discrepancy, the former is Rp138,975,021.38, and the latter is Rp98,656,308.50. The 
unequal pattern between productivity and helper wages is also shown in the Figure7. Helper wages 
and workers productivity (a yearly basis). 
On the workers supply side, the number of working-age in a province (Waj) and the 
number of non-farming freelance workers in a province (Fwj) show a significant relationship to 
the gap of wages and helper wages. In the provinces with more non-farming freelance workers 
(Fwj), the construction workers get less wage and more gap to the minimum wage. On the other 
hand, in the provinces with a greater number of working ages (Waj), the construction workers get 
more earnings and less gap to the minimum wage. That phenomenon indicates that a greater 
number of working ages may coincide with busier construction projects resulting in more demand 
and more earnings for construction workers. 
 
Level of formality and construction worker wages 
The level of formality as a proxy of minimum wage coverage shows a significant 
relationship to the gap of wages and helper wages. The regression result shows that higher 
formality means more earning and less gap to minimum wages. This finding confirms the logic of 
partial and general equilibrium approaches, which implies that higher coverage and enforcement 
of minimum wages will give more effect to the informal sector. 
 
d. Conclusion 
Based on the data and analysis above, we can conclude some points. First, the variation of 
construction worker wages across provinces follows the variation of minimum wages. However, 
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the base earning of construction workers is not minimum wage, but a market wage. Second, the 
magnitude of GDP and worker productivity in a province is unrelated to construction workers’ 
earnings. This finding may indicate that construction workers productivity across regions is more 
or less equal. If the productivity of construction workers in provinces with high productivity are 
in line, the market wages should follow the pattern of workers productivity. Yet, figure 7 shows 
that helper wages and workers productivity across provinces walk in different ways. Third, the 
level of formality in a province shows a positive relation to construction workers’ wages. This 
phenomenon implies that a higher minimum wage does not harm informal sector earnings. Fourth, 
the minor variation of workers wages across provinces confirms Soemardi (2011) finding that the 
nature of construction workers are moving from one project to another across cities as part-time 
workers. 
Regarding public procurement, the commitment officer (PPK) in each government office 
should realize that, in general, base wages for construction workers are less than minimum wages. 
Therefore, the commitment officers (PPK) are better to use market wages as the base of estimation 
price rather than minimum wages. Utilizing market wages as a base of project value will increase 
the quality of price estimation and encourage tighter competition among contractors. 
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